ance declined by $40.4 billion. Nearly $19 billion of this was a decline in the balance in fuels and lubricants from rising fuel imports. An additional $17.1 billion was a decline in the balance in manufactured goods. Although substantial changes occurred in the prices and total values of individual agricultural imports and exports-including a $2.3 billion increase in the value of green coffee imports, a $1.1 billion decline in the value of grains exports, and a $1.1 billion rise in soybean exports-the overall agricultural balance declined by only $1.9 billion. In the remainder of the paper I focus on fuels and manufactured goods, the two commodity categories responsible for most of the change in the trade balance between 1975 and 1977. Because the members of OPEC have spent some of their proceeds on U.S. exports, it would be incorrect to consider the entire increase in U.S. fuels expenditure as widening the trade deficit. The long-run respending coefficient is probably only about 16 cents to the dollar, however, so that most of our oil increase does lead to a decline in the trade balance. The growth in fuel demand in 1977 was extraordinary. Given the 6.0 percent growth in U.S. real GNP between 1975 and 1976, the 6.9 percent rise in domestic demand for petroleum products in 1976 was not unexpected. In the first nine months of 1977, however, the rise in refined petroleum demand of 8.0 percent, accompanied by an increase of 24.3 percent in oil imports, occurred despite a rise of only 4.7 percent in real GNP over the same period. An exceptionally cold winter and poor rainfall in the Northwest, which led to a dramatic loss in hydroelectric power, accounted for this extraordinary rise in demand.
Fuels and Lubricants Trade
U.S. imports averaged 8.8 million barrels a day (mbd) for the first nine months of 1977.4 My estimates would attribute about 0.36 mbd in the first quarter to the effects of the cold winter on the demand of residential and commercial establishments for extra heating oils; perhaps 0.1 mbd over the winter because increased demand by high-priority residential users reduced natural gas available to commercial, industrial, and utility establishments; and 0.43 mbd for the full nine months because of the loss of hydroelectric power. Together these unusual events raised imports by 0.57 mbd over the nine months, or a total of 154 million barrels. At $13.26 a barrel, the implied increase in U.S. dollar imports was $2.0 billion, or an annual rate of $2.7 billion.5 In addition, demand was apparently enlarged by an unusual buildup of oil inventories in 1977. Total stocks of crude oil and refined products in the third quarter of 1977 were about 11 percent greater than those a year earlier.
Realistic projections put 1985 oil imports at about 12 mbd. These projections imply an average annual growth in the volume of oil imports of directly, however, OPEC spending would raise incomes abroad and thus increase U.S. exports to third countries. A rough estimate adds an additional 3.4 cents of U.S. exports from this source. There would also be some additional OPEC purchases of services.
4. The calculations here use U.S. Bureau of Mines figures from the Monthly Energy Review. Measured on a balance-of-payments basis, imports tend to be about one-half million barrels a day larger.
5. Additional demand for heating oil was estimated using a method suggested by Heywood Fleisig of the Federal Reserve Board. An elasticity of a 9 percent increase in fuel use for a 10 percent increase in degree-days was obtained from American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, ASHARE Guide and Data Book: Systems, 1970 (ASHARE, 1970), p. 628. The effect of the natural gas curtailment on industry was derived by comparing actual demand with an estimate by the U.S. Department of Energy, which assumes normal weather conditions. The estimate of the loss of hydropower assumes that the entire shortfall in power production from its 1975 level was met by oil imports. There is almost unanimous agreement that the disparity in the rates of cyclical expansion between the United States and its trading partners has been a major factor in this deterioration. However, the contribution made by a decline in the U.S. competitive position has been the subject of considerable debate. In particular, some administration spokesmen have strongly denied that there is any evidence of a "competitive decline." I turn first to this issue. Assuming raw-materials costs in different countries increase by similar amounts, relative export prices will be determined by standard unit labor costs (wages in relation to normal productivity), profit margins, and exchange rates.6 Although the relative price of U.S. exports fell sharply between 1970 and 1974 (column 1), it did not decline by the same order of magnitude as the dollar-denominated standard unit labor costs (column 6). This suggests that U.S. exporters enjoyed an improvement in their profit margins relative to those of other exporters. About half the decrease in relative standard unit labor costs over this period can be attributed to changes in exchange rates and half to a smaller rise in standard unit labor costs in the United States.
The turnaround of roughly 15 percent in relative export prices from 1975:1 to 1976:2 (column 1) parallels exchange rates remarkably; in domestic currencies, relative standard unit labor costs did not change appreciably, and the similarity of changes in prices and standard unit labor costs suggests that relative profit margins remained constant. The rise from 1975 appears to have been smaller in relative import prices than in relative export prices, but more persistent; relative import prices increased only in the third quarter of 1977. This could reflect a greater willingness on the part of foreign sellers to maintain their dollar prices in the U.S. market or the larger role that developing countries (with weaker currencies) have in U.S. imports of manufactured goods. As column 3 indicates, export prices have risen faster than the U.S. wholesale price index in the 1974-76 period. But the hypothesis that the increase in the relative prices of U.S. manufactured exports is due to a relative rise in the demand for these goods is rejected by data on the U.S. It would be helpful to have volume-shares data on manufactured goods for particular markets to test the hypothesis that U.S. trade is relatively more concentrated in areas that are stagnating than is trade of other major exporters of manufactured goods. Unfortunately, no detailed recent information on manufactured-goods exports to particular markets is available.
Several analysts have argued that the weakness in U.S. exports stems from the large proportion of capital goods in the total. In fact, weak capital-goods exports have not been an unusual factor in the deterioration of the manufactured-goods balance. In volume terms, U.S. capital goods have indeed performed poorly, changing for three successive half years at annual rates of 4.6 percent in the first half of 1976, -10.5 percent in 8. The share is computed as the ratio of the quantity index of U.S. manufacturedgoods exports to the quantity index of manufactured-goods exports of ten major industrialized countries. U.S. manufactured-goods imports from those ten countries have been removed from the denominator. United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various March, June, September, and December issues, "Manufactured Goods Exports" tables. 
. Output Effects. Both potential output and the ratio of actual to potential output were used as explanatory variables to capture cyclical effects as well as conventional secular elasticities. The coefficient of Q* indicates the net effect of foreign long-run supply and demand elasticities of U.S. exports. Q/Q* would be positive if foreign demand for U.S. exports were especially influenced by small or negative output gaps or if tightening supply constraints abroad expanded imports of U.S. substitutes. The similar magnitude of the coefficients of Q* and Q/Q* in both equations 6-1 and 6-2 suggests that foreign output alone is a sufficient explanatory variable for U.S. manufactured exports, and that, surprisingly, there are no extraordinary cyclical effects.
Some attempts to introduce other variables in explaining exports failed, but are worth reporting. The U.S. manufactured-goods output gap was not statistically significant. This supports the notion that the United States is a large, inward-directed economy, in which low levels of capacity utilization do not stimulate exports, independent of the effect reflected in prices, and high levels are not a constraint on supplying the foreign market. Attempts to model explicitly the demand of less developed countries did not improve the results. The most ambitious of these was the construction of an industrial production index for the rest of the world that combined the OECD indexes of industrial production for Europe, Japan, and Canada with an industrial production index for developing market economies." Specifications of nonlinearity in the ratio of actual 10. These estimates use a modified Cobb-Douglas production function, by Artus, "Measures of Potential Output." 11. To mitigate the omission of an explicit LDC demand variable, the shares variable reported above was used as the dependent variable; independent variables were specified in the same manner as those in the export equations. This yielded results and out-of-sample forecasts very similar to equations 6-1 and 6-2.
to potential output or division of the cycle into phases-according to whether the ratio was rising or falling and whether it was above or below the long-run average-did not yield significant results. A weighted average of the volume of investment in machinery and equipment in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany was not significant in capturing cyclical effects. Finally, lagged output variables were not significant.
Price 6-1 and 6-2; it substantially worsened the out-of-sample predictions of equation 6-2, which are discussed below. Thus the lags shown were chosen even though the coefficients for the longest lag used, or for an additional lag when it was added, were not negligible. This suggests that the ultimate price elasticity may be somewhat larger than the estimates shown here. Output Effects. The estimates shown in both equations 6-3 and 6-4 tell a similar story relating import volumes to U.S. output. Given that the economy grows along its potential path, imports will grow about three times as fast as potential. For each percent deviation from this path, imports will deviate by about 2 percent in the same direction.
IMPORTS
Numerous attempts to develop other cyclical variables were unsuccessful. Disaggregation of the cycle into phases according to whether the gap was above or below its long-run average or whether it was closing or widening contributed little additional explanation, nor did modeling nonlinearity into the cyclical response. Attempts to capture inventory restocking and plant and equipment expenditures were also unsuccessful, and lagged cyclical variables were insignificant.
Price Effects. The long-run price elasticity in both equations 6-3 and 6-4 of 1.5 and 1.4, respectively, are quite similar to the 1.6 price elasticity for exports. The mean lags are also similar. The most powerful effects again come after a year to eighteen months. However, these temporary effects will have a permanent impact: they will change the distribution and total stock of assets in the international economy. Foreign holdings of dollar assets will be higher than they otherwise would be. To hold dollar assets, foreigners will require higher yields that are explicitly built into interest rates or implicitly into anticipated exchange-rate changes. -19. This forecast is based on the following assumptions: oil from the Alaskan pipeline will flow at its capacity rate of 1.2 mbd by spring 1978 as scheduled, and 0.5 mbd will be stored in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; hydroelectric power shortages will decline to the equivalent of 0.19 mbd; and oil production in the lower forty-eight states will decline by 4 percent. The total demand for energy is assumed to increase to 105 percent of the estimated normal 1977 demand. 20. The GNP forecasts made by the OECD of 3 percent for the four major European economies, 3.75 percent for Canada, and 5 percent for Japan were used to predict manufacturing output in these countries on the basis of the historic relationship between the GNP and manufacturing output.
Concluding Comments
The nation's trade balance is a residual item that reflects the interaction of a number of domestic and foreign factors such as rates of growth, rates of inflation, tastes, factor endowments. There is no need for an economy to have exports equal in value to imports-by commodity category, by trading partner, or in total. Indeed, it is precisely because monetary exchange removes the need for bilateral balancing that it is superior to barter in facilitating specialization. What matters is not the trade balance itself but the factors that lie behind it. A particular value for the balance is satisfactory only if it is associated with an acceptable configuration of other, more important, national and international objectives.
Behind the 1977 U.S. trade balance lie some positive developments and others that policy should attempt to change. The sustained recovery in the United States, the rapid growth of productive capacities in developing countries, and the restoration of relative calm to the international grains market are all positive factors despite their contributions to the trade deficit. In these areas it is important that certain policies not be adopted.
An economy as closed as the United States should not reduce its aggregate demand in order to lower its imports, particularly when, as in December 1977, it is already operating with an unemployment rate of 6.4 percent and with only 83 percent of its industrial capacity utilized. A trade deficit entails a large government deficit at full employment (given private net savings), and this makes a balanced budget an even more unsuitable target for policy.
Economic expansion at home is also needed to assist in the absorption of workers who are inevitably displaced by secular changes in the U.S. icies harm the more efficient U.S. producers, particularly those who manufacture exportables, as they keep the exchange rate higher than it would be otherwise. Punishing the productive sector is obviously bad social policy. Adjustment assistance is the required response for workers whose industries can no longer compete. Devaluation is the appropriate method of improving an economy's competitive situation. In the long run, protectionism would prove counterproductive: it would encourage retaliation by other countries, which could further harm U.S. exporters, thereby reducing both the prospects for recovery and the gains from trade. In addition, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Brazil, and Mexico, which are at last rising from poverty, should not be deprived of the gains from trade-led growth.
On the agricultural front, an international agreement for providing adequate world stocks of wheat and grains should be concluded before large cutbacks in production are induced. High grain prices may help U.S. exports in the short run, but by raising domestic inflation and by encouraging other countries to aim at self-sufficiency, they harm exports in the long run.
In other areas, however, there are policies that must be adopted. The U.S. government has to decide upon an energy policy to remove the uncertainties that hinder energy conservation and encourage inefficient fuel use. The probable gains from an energy policy will take time to accrue, but in the short run the adoption of a plan could bolster confidence in the dollar. There are some measures that could have important effects even in the short run. In particular, the current bias that favors oil and gas imports over domestic production should be corrected. The refined-petroleum entitlements system and the practice of encouraging imports of natural gas at 50 to 100 percent above interstate price ceilings are inefficient because users do not pay the marginal cost, and this inefficiency is harmful to the trade balance.
There is a need for more expansionary policies in the major industrial nations abroad. Such policies would meet their own domestic as well as international requirements. The failure of major economies to achieve their own growth targets during 1977 signals the need for action. Such policies could directly wipe out one-third of the U.S. deficit over a few years. They could also alleviate some of the problems faced by the smaller industrial and developing economies. The simplest way for Japan and Germany to avoid the need for their own currencies to appreciate, thereby penalizing their export industries, is to increase their own demand for goods from abroad by expansionary policies.
Probably the greatest controversy surrounds the appropriate U.S. exchange rate. It is easy to advocate an optimal exchange-rate intervention policy but nearly impossible to implement it in practice. Intervention is appropriate in response to disorderly markets or to disturbances that will reverse themselves, such as crop failures. However, when the change is fundamental, avoiding the need for adjustment will eventually mean having to do too much too late. Smaller adjustments are preferable to large discrete shocks. The large recent bilateral changes in exchange rates are in part the consequence of unwise intervention in the past.22
One of the best ways to undermine faith in the dollar and to induce a shift into other currencies is to support the value of the dollar when its long-run determinants signal a decline. The responsibility of the United States as the major reserve-currency country is to avoid having its international accounts approach a state of fundamental disequilibrium, rather than to avoid change at all costs. The United States should demonstrate its concern for the value of the dollar by its pursuit of policies that influence the dollar's basic determinants: policies to reduce domestic inflation, establish a long-run energy strategy, and promote a prosperous, coordinated, international economy. In response, Lawrence agreed that no single index should be relied upon to measure competitiveness, but noted that all indexes showed some erosion and that the relative-price index for manufactured-goods imports showed a steady deterioration right through mid-1977. He pointed out that value shares such as those computed by the Commerce Department were particularly unreliable indicators of competitiveness because of the inelastic response to prices in the short run. He defended his estimates of price elasticities, noting that in his paper he had reported other studies that corroborated the elasticities and timing of the price effects he had obtained.
Discussion
Some suggestions were made for improving the specification of the import equations. George von Furstenberg suggested disaggregating GNP within an input-output formulation in order to capture the effects of changes in its composition among components with different import intensities. Robert Solomon believed it might be hard to disentangle cyclical swings in foreign investment demand from price effects; on closer analysis the recent weakness of investment abroad might explain more of the recent deterioration of U.S. manufactured exports, which are heavily weighted by capital goods. R. A. Gordon thought it was important in explaining recent trade flows to model explicitly the changes in long-run comparative advantage that lay behind the growing success of less developed countries in competing in manufactured-goods trade. Lawrence replied that while explaining individual country shares might require such an analysis, average price and income changes provided an adequate explanation for the aggregate changes in manufactured-goods trade without making special allowance for the export success of the less developed countries or other individual nations.
Hendrik Houthakker raised the issue of whether exchange rates reflect primarily the balance in the trade account, the current account, or the capital account. He had concluded that the trade account is far more important than a monetarist approach would imply: indeed, except for very short-term fluctuations, exchange rates among industrial nations primarily mirror export prices. He believed that an average of all export prices, as opposed to those for manufacturing alone that Lawrence had investigated, would show exchange rates moving so as to keep relative dollar prices among countries unchanged. Solomon observed that in both Germany and Japan in recent years, cyclical movements in the domestic economy had resulted in movements in exchange rates in the opposite direction. The upward pressure from the effects of economic slack on the current account had dominated the downward pressure from the effects of low interest rates on the capital account. The variations of the dollar since 1975 also follow this pattern, whereas in the 1960s, movements in the capital account had tended to dominate the current account. Walter Salant reasoned that wide publicity about the trade deficit was likely to lead to additional weakening of the capital account because it stimulated expectations of depreciation; but in its direct effect on exchange rates, he doubted that a dollar of trade deficit was different from a dollar of deficit elsewhere in the balance of payments. Houthakker observed that the current account had become more conspicuous because figures for other balances are no longer published. He suggested that at least a basic balance and an overall balance be reported.
Discussants were divided on the issue of whether the government ought to intervene to support the dollar. Lawrence Krause felt that Lawrence had offered a timely demonstration that there were fundamental reasons for some decline in the value of the dollar. He observed that foreign governments-anxious to enlarge the U.S. deficit and in the process reduce their own and stimulate their economies-had intervened in the past to support the dollar on the grounds that no change in basic competitiveness had occurred. But Lawrence had shown that a substantial loss of competitiveness had in fact occurred and that it was appropriate for the dollar to decline in response. Some other participants saw more merit in intervention. William Cline cautioned that because the dollar had moved down considerably further in recent months subsequent to Lawrence's data set, and because of the ambiguity of some of the measures of competitiveness, it might be inappropriate to conclude that intervention should be rejected.
The exchange rate reacts to the contemporary current-account balance, but trade flows respond to changes in the rate only after a lag. Excessive depreciation of the dollar now in response to a highly unfavorable current account could induce an excessive increase in the trade balance in the future. If this were the case, some intervention (at least enough to frustrate the "one-way bet" over the medium term) would be appropriate in order to avoid unnecessary cycling in the exchange rate and the current account. John Kareken reasoned that, with flexible exchange rates and free movements of capital, there might be no well-defined equilibrium exchange rate. Governments might have to intervene, or at least threaten to do so, if they wanted to keep rates from changing indiscriminately. Bruce MacLaury noted that, within a broad range of exchange rates, private markets might stabilize at whatever point governments indicated a willingness to intervene, while, in the absence of some intervention from the government, rates might fluctuate excessively, overshooting the equilibrium range. Others pointed out that it was impossible to determine when markets were overshooting and therefore when they could be stabilized profitably by intervention.
